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Abstract  
We study the effects of dual processing differences that arise from the state level (through 
experimental manipulation of the decision mode), the trait level (using individual difference 
measures of the decision mode), and their interaction on cooperative behavior. In a survey 
experiment with a representative sample of the Swedish population (N = 1,828), we elicited the 
individuals’ primary decision mode and experimentally varied whether individuals could rely on 
their preferred mode or were induced to rely either on emotion or reason. Cooperation was 
measured across a series of commonly used and incentivized games (prisoner’s dilemma game, 
public goods game, trust game, dictator game). At the state level, our results show that average 
cooperation rates increased when emotions were induced rather than reason. At the trait level, our 
results show that individual decision modes and cooperation rates were not correlated when 
subjects could rely on their primary mode, but traits interacted with our processing manipulation: 
Experimentally inducing emotions increased cooperation among individuals who otherwise rely 
primarily on reason, but not among individuals who already rely primarily on emotion. These 
findings suggest that individuals integrate their traits with emotion-based states by substituting 
their trait rather than enhancing it. Thus, who is affected by emotions in their decision to cooperate 
crucially depends on state-trait interactions at the point of decision. 
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1. Introduction 
The hypothesis that intuition promotes cooperation has attracted considerable interest across 
disciplines (Rand 2012, Tinghög 2013). According to this notion, a first, intuitive response to 
social dilemmas is linked to cooperation, while reason and deliberation is linked to self-interest. 
The empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis is mixed (Rand et al. 2014, Bouwmeester et 
al. 2017) and recent meta-analyses have revealed considerable between-study heterogeneity 
depending on the type of manipulation that is used to induce intuition (Rand 2016, Kvarven et al. 
2020).1 Accordingly, intervening in decision processing by directly asking people to either rely 
on their emotion or reason seems to be an effective way to alter cooperation in social dilemmas.  
However, how people process decisions is not only determined at the state-level. Individuals 
also exhibit trait-like variations in how much they prefer to rely on intuition and deliberation when 
making decisions. Such traits describe a disposition of the individual (Allport and Odbert 1936, 
Spielberger and Sydeman 1994) and can interact with exogenously induced states (Block 2005, 
Hammond et al. 1987, Betsch and Kunz 2008). Such interaction effects can contribute to our 
understanding of how individuals integrate their personal processing mode with the processing 
mode favored by the situation in the realm of cooperative behavior. These effects are also 
potentially policy relevant, since studying state-trait interactions in decision processing can help 
us predict who would be affected by which type of intervention. Nevertheless, such state-trait 
interactions receive little attention in the literature that studies the link between dual processing 
and cooperation. This paper provides an experimental test of state-trait interactions in 
emotion/reason-based decision making on cooperation in a wide range of incentivized games 
using a large, representative sample of the Swedish population. 
State-trait interactions could occur, if intuitive (deliberative) decision makers react differently 
to emotion- and reason-inducing states. The most prominent theory generating hypotheses for 
these cases is regulatory fit theory (Higgins 2005), which suggests that individuals react more 
strongly to a state if it matches their trait. Accordingly, we would expect that an intuitive state 
increases cooperation more among individuals who prefer to rely on intuition when making 
decisions than individuals who prefer to rely on deliberation. Opposite to regulatory fit theory, 
one may hypothesize that highly deliberative individuals have more scope to raise the focus on 
their intuition than already intuitive decision makers. Accordingly, we would expect an intuitive 
state to have a larger positive effect on cooperation among individuals with a more deliberative 
trait than individuals with a more intuitive trait.  

1 The data of this study was made available to Kvarven et al. (2020).  
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Our experiment randomized individuals into one of three treatments. We chose to implement 
the intervention producing the largest, positive effect on cooperation as reported in meta-studies 
(Rand 2016, Kvarven et al. 2020), which was to induce emotion and reason using a direct 
instructions intervention (Levine et al. 2018, Horstmann et al. 2010). Accordingly, our treatments 
either directly instructed subjects to rely on either their emotion or their reason when making 
decisions, or provided no such instructions. Individual decision-making traits were elicited with 
the Unified Scale to Assess Individual Differences in Intuition and Deliberation (USID, Pachur 
and Spaar 2015). Cooperative behavior is measured within-subject across a set of incentivized 
games, including the prisoner’s dilemma game, public goods game, trust game, dictator game, and 
charitable giving. Thus, we, first, provide a test of whether the causal effects of emotion- and 
reason-inducing treatments on cooperation (Levine et al. 2018) generalize to a more 
comprehensive, cross-game measure of cooperation as well as a measure of consistency across 
games, or “cooperative phenotype” (Peysakhovich et al. 2014). Second, we provide a test of the 
relation between the individuals’ preferred decision mode, i.e. a psychological trait measure, and 
their cooperative behavior. And, third, measuring traits and the effect of states in one sample 
allowed us to explore whether the causal effects of inducing emotion and reason on cooperation 
vary across individuals with intuitive and deliberative decision-making traits.  
Our results show that inducing emotion, rather than reason, increased average cooperation 
rates in the set of games, suggesting that instructing people to rely on their emotion/reason affects 
cooperation in a broader sense. Inducing emotion, compared to inducing reason, also increased 
the correlation of behavior across games, suggesting that the instructions interventions affect the 
number of motives subjects considered. Individual decision-making traits, if uninfluenced as in 
our baseline treatment, were not correlated with cooperation rates. However, we find evidence of 
an interaction between traits and states. Experimentally inducing emotion-based decision making, 
compared to the baseline treatment, increased cooperation rates among subjects who prefer a 
deliberative decision-making mode, but not among primarily intuitive decision makers. This 
suggests that individuals integrate their traits with emotion-inducing states by substituting their 
mode rather than enhancing it. Experimentally inducing reason-based decision making, on the 
other hand, decreased cooperation rates among both decision-making types, suggesting that the 
use of reason can be enhanced. Lastly, we show that deliberative and intuitive decision makers 
also differed in their observable socioeconomic characteristics but that these differences were not 
driving the differential effects of the emotion-inducing treatment. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental 
design and procedure. Section 3 presents the results of manipulation checks. Section 4 presents 
the results of our experiment. Section 5 discusses the results and draws conclusions. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Sample 
A survey was sent to a representative sample of the Swedish population above 18 years old through 
the survey company CMA Research in April and May of 2017.2 The company collects data from 
their nation-wide panel of about 20,000 adults who were selected to be representative of the 
Swedish population in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. Quota sampling was provided 
to make sure that the recruited sample had approximately the same proportion of individuals in 
terms of different age groups, gender, and geographical regions as the population. Table A1 in the 
appendix reports descriptive statistics of our sample and compares these to Swedish population 
statistics. Data was collected until about 1800 participants completed our survey. We documented 
attrition from the survey at a rate of 20.6 percent. Overall, we have data of 1,828 individuals, after 
excluding subjects with incomplete responses and missing values in key variables. Our results are 
robust to including incomplete responses, however, we focus our main analysis on complete data 
for better comparability. The robustness of our results to including incomplete survey responses 
are reported in Appendix C. Our sample of about 600 subjects per treatment allows us to detect 
the full size of the main effect reported in Levine et al. (2018) with more than 99 percent power 
and up-to small interaction effects with at least 80 percent power.3  
2.2. Procedure 
We designed an online survey that allows us to causally identify the effect of emotion- and reason-
inducing states on cooperation across different decision-making traits in a (3 X 1)-between-subject 
design. Subjects were randomized into one of three treatments that induced subjects to make their 
decisions either based on emotion or reason using a direct instructions intervention (Horstmann et 
al. 2010), or gave no such instructions. The details of the treatment conditions are outlined in 
section 2.3. Each subject made cooperation choices in a number of social dilemmas, which were 
incentivized and presented in random order. This allows us to construct a within-subject measure 
of cooperation across commonly used games, the details of which are outlined in section 2.4. 
Individual differences in decision-making traits were elicited with the Unified Scale to Assess 

2 Data from the same experiment is also described and analyzed in Gärtner et al. (2019). 
3 These estimates are based on Models 2a and 3a of Experiment 3 reported in Levine et al. (2018), from which we 
derive Cohen’s d = 0.45, and assuming Į = 0.05. 
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Individual Differences in Intuition and Deliberation (USID, Pachur and Spaar 2015). The USID 
is described in more detail in section 2.5. The order of the games, which were subject to our 
treatment conditions, and the trait elicitation was randomized. We find no effects of the order of 
trait elicitation and economic decisions on the average traits scores or of the treatment conditions 
on subsequent traits scores. Finally, our survey asked subjects to answer questions about their 
socioeconomic characteristics, real-world cooperative behavior and self-reported altruism 
(Rushton et al. 1981).  
Subjects received a fixed participation payment and were paid for one, randomly chosen 
decision. The experiment followed the ethical guidelines of the Swedish research council 
concerning the Ethical Review of Research Involving Humans (SFS 2003:460). The experimental 
instructions can be found in Appendix D, translated from Swedish into English.  
2.3. Experimental design 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three treatments. Based on the wording in Levine et 
al. (2018, study 3), the emotion treatment instructed subjects to rely on their emotions when 
making their choices in the games, while the reason treatment instructed subjects to rely on their 
reason. Subjects in the emotion [reason] treatment read the following; 
Sometimes people make decisions by using reason and relying on their brains. Other 
times, people make decisions by using emotion and relying on their hearts. 
Many people believe that the heart [brain] is the part of our body that is most 
connected with good decision-making. When we feel with our hearts [think with our 
brains], rather than think with our brains [feel with our hearts], we make emotionally 
[rationally] satisfying decisions. 
In this part of the experiment, please make your decisions by relying on your heart 
[brain], rather than your brain [heart]. 
 
The last sentence of the instructions was repeated for each game. A third treatment condition, 
the baseline treatment, gave no additional instructions. In the baseline treatment, subjects could 
follow their “regular” decision-making mode, which allows us to separate the contributions of 
inducing emotion and inducing reason to the total effect of the emotion/reason-distinction. 
We conducted a number of manipulation checks to corroborate whether the instructions 
actually affected decision processing. Four questions elicited how subjects themselves judged 
their decision-making process, asking them to rate on 5-point Likert scales how much they relied 
on deliberation, intuition and emotions as well as how much the instructions made them think 
more about their decisions. Two additional measure tested the effect of instructions on behavioral 
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outcomes that have previously been associated with decision processing. First, we measured the 
likelihood with which subjects choose the dominated option in the Jellybean task (Denes-Raj and 
Epstein 1994; Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992; Peters et al. 2006) and, second, we elicited actual 
response times in the cooperation decisions. 
2.4. Measures of cooperation 
Cooperative behavior was elicited within-subject in a series of incentivized choices: Cooperation 
in the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), cooperation in the public goods game (PGG), trust, 
trustworthiness, dictator game (DG) giving and charitable giving. The PDG followed the 
instructions and trade-offs in payoffs used in Levine et al. (2018). Subjects were paired with 
another, randomly chosen participant. Each subject was endowed with 30 SEK (about $3.4) and 
subjects simultaneously chose to either keep or transfer their endowment to the other participant. 
Transferred money was multiplied by two. Subjects received the money they chose to keep plus 
twice the money that was transferred to them by the other participant. The PGG followed the 
instructions and trade-offs in payoffs used in Rand et al. (2012). Four randomly grouped subjects 
simultaneously chose to either keep their endowment of 40 SEK (about $4.6) or to give it to the 
group. Contributions were pooled, multiplied by two, and equally distributed among all members 
of the group. Thus, subjects received the amount they kept and one-fourth of the money pooled in 
their group. Our measure of trust behavior was a sequential version of the PDG, which is 
equivalent to a binary trust game. The first-mover choice in the sequential PDG measures trust, 
while the second-mover choice (conditional on the other player having contributed) measures 
trustworthiness.4 In the DG, subjects chose how much of 60 SEK (about $6.9) to give to another, 
randomly selected player. In the charitable giving decisions, subjects had two opportunities to give 
any amount of 60 SEK to a charity (Red Cross, Unicef). The order of the PDGs, the PGG, the DG 
and charitable giving was randomized across subjects. No feedback about the outcomes of the 
games was given before the end of the experiment. Table 1 gives an overview of the cooperation 
choices we elicited.  
For the main analysis, we constructed a composite measure of cooperation that is the 
individual average share of cooperative choices across games. In particular, the average 
cooperation rate is the average over the indicators for whether the individual made a contribution 
in the PDG, made a contribution in the PGG, contributed in the trust decision, contributed in the 
trustworthiness decision (given the other player chooses to trust), shared (at least) equally in the 

4 To allow for the matching of all possible cases, we also elicited the second-mover choice conditional on the other 
player having defected.  
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dictator game and shared (at least) equally with (at least) one of the charities. Robustness checks 
consider the games separately and other subsets of games. In particular, we also look at the subset 
of “pure” cooperation choices (excluding trust), “strategic” choices (PDG, PGG, and trust) as well 
as “non-strategic” choices (trustworthiness, DG, and charitable giving). Moreover, our within-
subject measures of cooperation allowed us to estimate how predictive cooperation of one game 
is for cooperation in another game across all pairs of games, i.e. we could test whether treatments 
or traits also affect the strength of the individuals’ “cooperative phenotype” (Peysakhovich et al. 
2014).   
We checked understanding in the PDG and the PGG with two control questions each, which 
are elicited after each game and not incentivized. We devote Appendix B to discussing the 
robustness of our results to excluding subjects without proven understanding. Overall, we find 
that effect sizes are robust to excluding these subjects. 
 
Table 1. Measures of cooperative behavior in experiment 
Prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG)  Two players made simultaneous, binary choice whether to 
contribute money or not  
Public goods game (PGG)  Four players made simultaneous, binary choice whether to 
contribute money or not 
Trust game First-mover choice in a sequential PDG (trust) 
 Second-mover choice in sequential PDG conditional on 
contribution by other player (trustworthiness) 
Dictator game (DG) Choice to share any amount of fixed endowment with 
another player 
Charitable giving Choice to share any amount of fixed endowment with a 
charitable organization 
 
2.5. Elicitation of decision-making traits 
Decision-making traits were elicited with the Unified Scale to Assess Individual Differences in 
Intuition and Deliberation (USID, Pachur and Spaar 2015), which addresses weaknesses of 
previously used trait measures and unifies them, such as the Preference for Intuition and 
Deliberation scale (PID, Betsch 2004) and the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI, Pacini and 
Epstein 1999). Subjects rated 32 statements according to how well they describe their own 
decision-making style in life in general on 5-point Likert scales. One half of the statements 
described intuitive and spontaneous decision making, the other half of the statements described 
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decision making that is based on reason and knowledge. Taking the mean of all statement ratings 
in the USID for each individual, we constructed three measures of decision-making traits: (i) a 
score that measures the individual tendency to rely on intuition in decision making, (ii) a score 
that measures the individual tendency to rely on deliberation in decision making, and (iii) an 
indicator for whether an individual relies primarily on intuition (intuition score > deliberation 
score) or primarily on deliberation (deliberation score  intuition score) when making decisions. 
Thus, we could test the independent effect of each trait as well as the importance of their relative 
strengths. Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates the distribution of traits. 
3. Manipulation checks  
Table 2 presents the results of our manipulation checks. We find that subjects reported lower 
reliance on deliberation and higher reliance on their emotions and intuition in the emotion 
treatment, compared to the reason treatment. There was no significant difference in how much the 
instructions made subjects think about their decisions across treatments. The share of rational 
choices in the Jellybean task was lower in the emotion treatment than the reason treatment. 
Response times across the games were faster in the emotion treatment than the reason treatment. 
Thus, our manipulation checks suggest that the instruction treatments in fact manipulated decision 
processing. 
 
Table 2. Manipulation checks 
 Treatments Difference 
 Baseline Emotion Reason Emotion vs. Reason
Relied on intuition (mean rating) 3.23 3.51 3.02 <0.001 
Relied on emotions (mean rating) 3.10 3.53 2.69 <0.001 
Relied on deliberation (mean rating) 3.84 3.66 3.95 <0.001 
Instructions: thought more (mean rating)  3.46 3.42 3.50 0.215 
Jellybean task: rational choices (in percent) 0.67 0.63 0.70 0.010 
Average response times (log) 2.45 2.43 2.49 0.023 
Notes: Averages were estimated using full sample. The last columns presents p-values of two-sided t-tests and Ȥ2-tests, 
respectively. Relied on intuition measures the answer to “I relied on my intuition when making the decisions in this 
experiment.”, Relied on emotions measures the answer to “I relied on my emotions when making decisions in this 
experiment.”, Relied on deliberation measures the answer to “I relied on my deliberation when making the decisions in 
this experiment.”, and Instructions: thought more measures the answer to “The instructions in this experiment made me 
think more about my decisions.” on 5-point Likert scales. Jellybean task reports the share of rational (non-dominated) 
choices in the jellybean task. Average response times (log) is the average of the natural logarithm of response times across 
the cooperation decisions.  
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4. Results 
4.1. State-level effects of the decision mode on cooperation 
Figure 1 shows the effects of our treatments on cooperation rates. We find that inducing emotion, 
rather than reason, increased average cooperation rates (0.59 vs. 0.69, t = 5.602, p < 0.001, d = 
0.32).5 The effect was significant for five out of the six decisions. We find the largest increase in 
the decision to trust, with 24.38 percent, and the smallest increase in the decision to cooperate in 
the public good game, with 6.06 percent (see Table A2 in the appendix for the results for each 
game). The effect is robust in different subsets of the six decisions, including when looking only 
at “pure” cooperation choices (excluding trust), “strategic” choices (PDG, PGG, and trust), and 
“non-strategic” choices (trustworthiness, DG, and charitable giving; see Figure A2 in the 
appendix). Thus, the positive effect of inducing emotions, rather than reason, on cooperation in 
the prisoner’s dilemma game, as previously found in Levine et al. (2018), extends to our cross-
game measure of cooperation. 
Compared to the baseline treatment, the emotion treatment had a positive effect on 
cooperation rates (0.66 vs. 0.69, t = -1.743, p = 0.082, d = 0.10), while the reason treatment had a 
negative effect (0.66 vs. 0.59, t = 3.826, p < 0.001, d = 0.22). Inducing reason made up the majority 
(75.21 percent) of the total emotion/reason-treatment effect on cooperation. In line with this, the 
reason treatment affected cooperation in a larger number of games than the emotion treatment (see 
Table A2 in the appendix). The effect of the emotion treatment was smaller in the set of pure 
cooperation choices (p = 0.040; Figure A2), suggesting that the effect on the decision to trust is a 
strong driver of the overall effect. The effect of the emotion treatment was not significantly 
different across the subsets of strategic and non-strategic choices (p = 0.137; Figure A2). The 
effect of the reason treatment was not significantly different for the subset of pure cooperation 
choices (p = 0.924) but is larger for strategic than non-strategic choices (p = 0.063). 
Inducing emotion rather than reason increased the average correlation of cooperation 
decisions across pairs of games (ȡ = 0.296 vs. ȡ = 0.247, z = 2.275, p = 0.023). Compared to the 
baseline treatment (ȡ = 0.285), a majority of the change in the correlation coefficient (or, 77.6 

5 We find that the average cooperation rate was predictive of self-reported real-world cooperation. The cooperation 
rate measure positively correlated with subjects’ ratings of 5-point scales on how often they have given money to a 
charity in the last 12 months (ȕ = 1.127, p < 0.001), how often they have given money to a stranger in the last 12 
months (ȕ = 0.543, p < 0.001), how often they have donated clothes in the last 12 months (ȕ = 0.659, p < 0.001), how 
often they have donated blood in the last 12 months (ȕ = 0.309, p < 0.001), how often they have made active 
contributions to the environment in the last 12 months (ȕ = 0.591, p = 0.001), as well as whether they would like to 
donate their organs after death (ȕ = 0.264, p < 0.001) and whether they have registered as an organ donor (ȕ = 0.270, 
p < 0.001). The average cooperation rate was not significantly correlated with how often subjects had volunteered in 
the last 12 months (ȕ = 0.043, p = 0.785) or their stated demand for income redistribution in society (ȕ = -0.239, p = 
0.449).  
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percent) was due to inducing reason. These results hold for a majority of the pairwise comparison 
of games and other subsets (see Table A3 in the appendix). Thus, we find some evidence that 
choices across games were more consistent in the emotion than the reason treatment, suggesting 
that individuals consider fewer (more) motives in the emotion (reason treatment) and are more 
(less) likely to be of a “cooperative phenotype” (Peysakhovich et al. 2014).  
 
Figure 1. Cooperation across treatments 
 
Notes: The figure shows the frequency distribution of cooperation rates across treatments. 
The share of cooperative choices includes choices in the prisoner’s dilemma game, public 
goods game, trust game (trust and trustworthiness), dictator game and charitable giving. 
Estimates of Cohen’s d and p-values of two-sided t-tests refer to effect sizes when 
compared to the baseline treatment. 
 
4.2. Trait-level association between decision mode and cooperation  
Figure 2 shows the relation between decision-making traits and cooperative choices in the baseline 
condition. Cooperation rates are not significantly correlated with the strength of each individual 
decision-making trait (panels 1 and 2) or the relative strength of traits (0.67 vs. 0.65, t = 0.706, p 
= 0.480, d = 0.06, panel 3; see Figure A3 for distributions). This result holds for each game (Table 
A4 in the appendix), for different subsets of games (Figure A4) and when controlling for 
socioeconomic characteristics (columns 1-4 of Table A5). The correlation of choices across games 
is not significantly different across primarily intuitive and primarily deliberative subjects on 
average (ȡ = 0.271 vs. ȡ = 0.294, z = 0.722, p = 0.470), in most binary comparisons and in different 
subsets of games (Table A6). Overall, these results suggest that individual differences in decision-
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making traits do not affect average cooperation behavior when decision makers can follow their 
preferred decision-making mode. 
 
Figure 2. Cooperation across decision-making traits in the baseline treatment (n = 612) 
Notes: Panel 1 and 2 show scatters over 100 equally-sized bins of each trait and regression lines from OLS regressions controlling for the 
respective other trait. The p-value for the difference shown in panel 3 is based on a two-sided t-test.  
 
4.3. State-trait interactions: State-level effects across decision-making traits 
Next, we test whether individual decision-making traits interacted with the effects of treatments 
at the state level, i.e. whether the effects of inducing emotion and reason varied across the 
individually preferred decision modes. Figure 3a shows the effect of the emotion treatment across 
decision-making traits. Cooperation rates in the emotion treatment were not significantly related 
to the strength of the intuitive decision-making trait (panel 1, difference to baseline: p = 0.278), 
but increased in the strength of the deliberative trait (panel 2, difference to baseline: p = 0.043). 
Inducing emotion had no significant effect on individuals with a primarily intuitive trait (panel 3), 
while it increased cooperation of primarily deliberative individuals (panel 4, difference-in-
difference: p = 0.068). Table A7 in the appendix shows the results for each game. The results are 
robust to looking at “pure” cooperation choices (see Figure A5a in the appendix), when comparing 
strategic vs. non-strategic choices (Figure A5b-c), and to controlling for socioeconomic 
characteristics (see columns 5-8 of Table A5 and columns 1-6 in Table A8). Thus, our results 
suggest that only individuals who primarily rely on deliberation when making decisions increase 
their cooperation when emotion is induced. 
Figure 3b shows the effect of the reason treatment across decision-making traits. There was 
no significant relation between cooperation rates and the strength of each decision-making trait 
(panels 1 and 2, differences to baseline treatment: ps > 0.5). Both primarily intuitive and primarily 
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deliberative decision makers decreased their cooperation rates in the reason treatment compared 
to the baseline treatment (difference-in-difference: p = 0.826; see columns 9-12 of Table A5 and 
columns 7-12 in Table A8 for regression results). The results are robust when looking at only the 
subset of pure cooperation choices (Figure A5a). The negative effect of inducing reason was larger 
for non-strategic choices than strategic choices among primarily deliberative subjects (p = 0.094), 
but not among primarily intuitive subjects (p = 0.386; Figure A5b-c). Overall, these results suggest 
that, other than the emotion treatment, the reason treatment lowers the cooperation rates of 
individuals independent of their own preferred decision-making mode. 
 
Figure 3. Interactions effects on cooperative behavior 
(a) Emotion treatment (n = 612) 
(b) Reason treatment (n = 604) 
Notes: Panels 1 and 2 show scatters over 100 equally sized bins of the trait and regression lines from OLS regressions controlling for the 
respective other trait. The differences reported in panels 3 and 4 is based on a two-sided t-test.  
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We find no significant effects of the treatments on the correlation of choices among each 
decision-making type (emotion: del. ȡ = 0.294 vs. ȡ = 0.332, z = -1.460, p = 0.144; int. ȡ = 0.271 
vs. ȡ = 0.233, z = 1.035, p = 0.301; reason: del. ȡ = 0.294 vs. ȡ = 0.263, z = 1.156, p = 0.248, int. 
ȡ = 0.271 vs. ȡ = 0.217, z = 1.440, p = 0.150; see Tables A9 and A10 for each pair of games and 
subsamples). The directions of effects suggest that deliberative subjects considered fewer motives 
in the emotion treatment and more motives in the reason treatment, while intuitive subjects 
considered more motives whenever a frame was introduced.  
4.4. Socioeconomic differences 
Since we collected data on socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals, we also conducted an 
explorative analysis on whether the observed differential treatment effects across primary traits 
translate into differences in these observable individual characteristics. We could show that the 
observed differences in treatment effects on cooperation across primary decision-making traits 
were not due to decision-making traits merely picking up differences in socioeconomic variables 
affecting cooperation (see Table A8 in the appendix). However, primarily intuitive individuals 
may still differ from primarily deliberative individuals in terms of observable characteristics. 
Table 3 shows the relation between an individual’s primary decision-making trait and their gender, 
age and educational level. We find that a primarily intuitive trait was more common among 
individuals who are female, older and have lower education levels, though, the latter relation may 
be endogenous. These results are robust to using linear measures of decision-making traits (see 
Table A11 in the appendix). Thus, since our results showed that inducing emotion on average only 
positively affected the cooperation rates of primarily deliberative decision makers, these results 
suggest that inducing emotion treats a subpopulation that is more likely to be male, younger and 
more educated. 
Lastly, we explore how using student samples, a common sample selection in the literature, 
may affect whether we observe positive effects of inducing emotion on cooperation. We find that 
the students in our sample (7.49 percent) were more likely to exhibit a primarily deliberative 
decision-making trait than other individuals (75.91 percent vs. 63.93 percent, Ȥ2 = 7.984, p = 
0.005). This suggests that studies using student samples may overestimate the effect of inducing 
emotion on cooperation compared to studies using the general population.  
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Table 3. Socioeconomic characteristics across decision-making traits 
OLS regressions. Dependent variable: Primarily intuitive trait. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 0.117***   0.120*** 
 (0.022)   (0.022) 
Age  0.003***  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
High school   -0.146*** -0.124*** 
   (0.044) (0.044) 
Tertiary education   -0.272*** -0.254*** 
   (0.044) (0.044) 
Income Q2    -0.013 
    (0.035) 
Income Q3    -0.026 
    (0.036) 
Income Q4    0.015 
    (0.035) 
Income Q5    -0.020 
    (0.036) 
Constant 0.292*** 0.228*** 0.544*** 0.336*** 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.041) (0.057) 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.014 0.007 0.029 0.049 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Female is an indicator of 
gender. Age is a linear measure of age. Educational levels High School and Tertiary education indicate the 
individual’s highest level of education, while the reference is an indicator for Primary Education. Income 
indicators are constructed according to quintiles of the sample.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The conflict between emotions and reason has traditionally been a focus of the research on 
prosocial behavior. Less attention has been paid, however, to the state-trait interactions in dual 
processing in the realm of cooperative behavior. In this paper, we provide results from a carefully 
designed test of state-trait interactions in dual processing in a series of cooperation games using a 
large-scale survey experiment. We find that the positive effect of inducing emotion on cooperation 
was driven by otherwise deliberative decision makers. This result is robust to considering 
socioeconomic differences as well as differences in the understanding of games. 
Our results suggest that individuals change their behavior when their primary decision-
making trait mismatches the emotion-inducing state. These results are opposite to what we would 
have predicted following regulatory fit theory (Higgins 2005), which suggests that traits are 
fostered if they match the state. Instead, our results on the integration of traits and exogenously 
induced emotions suggest that individuals substitute their trait (individuals rely on emotions even 
though they prefer to rely on reason). Inducing reason, on the other hand, was found to affect 
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individuals of both types, suggesting that asking people to rely on reason leads to both substitution 
with their trait (individuals rely on reason even though they prefer to rely on emotions) and 
enhancement (individuals reason more even though this is already their preferred mode). It could 
also be argued that subjects use the direct instructions strategically, instead, serving as a signal 
when forming expectation of what the other player will choose (Levine et al. 2018). This could 
explain our results on state-trait interaction effect of inducing emotions on cooperation if only 
deliberative players updated their expectations. However, we also found state-trait interaction 
effects in the set of non-strategic decisions, which should not be affected by this mechanism. 
Our study finds a main effect of an emotion/reason-intervention using direct instructions on 
cooperation behavior in line with Rand (2016) and Levine et al. (2018). We can show that this 
effect extends to a more comprehensive, cross-game measure of cooperation and that we observe 
a stronger “cooperative phenotype” (Peysakhovich et al. 2014, Reigstad et al. 2017) when 
decisions are based on emotion rather than reason. This suggests that individuals consider more 
motives when reason is induced than when emotion is induced. Noticeably, we find that the 
negative effect of inducing reason on cooperation makes up a larger share of the total effect of the 
emotion/reason-distinction than the positive effect of inducing reason. Thus, future research 
should focus more on the impacts of (degrees of) deliberation on cooperative behavior.  
Recent meta-studies find no evidence of an effect of manipulating dual processing on 
cooperation games other than through direct instructions (Kvarven et al. 2020), or when studying 
altruistic behavior (Fromell et al. 2020). We find a positive effect of inducing emotion rather than 
reason through direct instructions on prosociality in a number of games, including the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, the trust game, the dictator game and charitable giving. The only social dilemma 
that did not show an effect in our experiment is the public goods game. Thus, it is possible that 
the public goods game has features, such as the larger number of players or its complexity, that 
affect the possibilities with which decision processing in this game can be manipulated.     
Finally, we show that deliberative decision makers differ from intuitive decision makers also 
in terms of their socioeconomics: They are more likely to be male, younger, have higher 
educational levels and are overrepresented among students. This result can be informative to 
stakeholders aiming to predict both who will be reached by an intervention and which target 
groups can be reached most cost-effectively. It is also informative to experimental researchers, 
suggesting that samples with more deliberative subjects (e.g., student samples) inflate the effects 
of inducing emotion on behavior. 
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Appendix A 
Figure A1. Scatter plot of decision-making traits (N = 1,828) 
 
Notes: The figure shows a scatter plot of the relation between the intuitive 
decision-making trait scores (M = 3.30, SD = 0.61, Cronbach’s Į = 0.88) and 
deliberative decision-making trait scores (M = 3.55, SD = 0.64, Cronbach’s Į 
= 0.91). 35.18 percent of subjects are relying primarily on intuition when 
making decision (intuition score > deliberation score) while 64.82 percent of 
subjects are relying primarily on deliberation (deliberation score  intuition 
score). 
 
Figure A2. Cooperation rates in different subsets of games (N = 1,828) 
a. “Pure” cooperation (excl. Trust) 
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b. Strategic decisions (incl. PDG, PGG and Trust) 
 
 
c. Non-strategic decisions (incl. Trustworthiness, DG and Charity) 
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Figure A3. Distribution of cooperation rates by primary trait in baseline treatment 
(n1 = 215, n2 = 397) 
 
 
 
Figure A4. Cooperation rates across traits in baseline treatment with different subsets of games  
(n = 612) 
a. “Pure” cooperation (excl. Trust) 
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b. Strategic decisions (incl. PDG, PGG and Trust) 
 
c. Non-strategic decisions (incl. Trustworthiness, DG and Charity) 
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Figure A5. Cooperation rates in different subsets of games and by primary trait (N = 1,828) 
a. “Pure” cooperation (excl. Trust) 
Emotion treatment 
Reason treatment 
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b. Strategic decisions (incl. PDG, PGG and Trust) 
Emotion treatment 
Reason treatment 
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c. Non-strategic decisions (incl. Trustworthiness, DG and Charity) 
Emotion treatment 
Reason treatment
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics and representativeness of sample 
 Sample Population X2-test/ t-test 
 M SD M SD X2/ t p 
Age 47.33 47.33 46.31  15.98 2.751 0.006 
Female 0.52 0.52 0.49  0.50 4.892 0.027 
Primary School 0.08 0.08 0.15  0.27 67.243 < 0.001 
High School 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.058 0.810 
Tertiary education 0.46 0.46 0.39  0.50 33.147 < 0.001 
Income (log) 11.11 3.81 11.48 2.94 -5.409 < 0.001 
Notes: N = 1,828. Sample exclusions due to attrition and missing values are outlined in Appendix C. Population 
values (except for income) are obtained from Statistics Sweden for the year 2016. The average age and share 
of women refer to all individuals 20-75 years old (N = 6,840,654). Educational levels are averages for the 
population ages 20-74 years old (N = 6,642,823). Individual labor income elicited in the survey is compared to 
the population values of the logarithm of labor and capital income in 2010 (N=6,684,887). The same table is 
part of the appendix of Gärtner et al. (2019). 
 
 
 
Table A2. Cooperation across games 
 Baseline 
treatment 
Emotion 
treatment 
Reason 
treatment 
Emotion 
vs. 
Reason 
Baseline 
vs. 
Emotion 
Baseline 
vs. 
Reason 
PDG 0.652 0.714 0.613 0.001 0.117 0.927 
PGG 0.595 0.595 0.561 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Trust 0.634 0.704 0.566 <0.001 0.054 0.095 
Trustworthiness 0.765 0.797 0.669 <0.001 1.000 0.001 
DG 0.618 0.639 0.545 0.005 1.000 0.060 
Charity 0.672 0.663 0.586 0.032 1.000 0.012 
Notes: N = 1,828. Columns 1-3 report average cooperation rates across treatments. Columns 4-6 report p-values of 
Chi-squared tests, Bonferroni adjusted for six tests. All variables are binary. PDG is an indicator for the choice to 
cooperate in the simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. PGG is an indicator for the choice to cooperate in a 4-
player public goods game. Trust is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as first player in a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Trustworthiness is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as second player in a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma game. DG is an indicator for the dictator choice to at least divide the pie in the dictator game equally. 
Charity is an indicator for the choice to divide the pie at least equally between the player and a charity for at least 
one of two charities. 
  
27 

 Table A3. Correlations across games and treatments 
 PDG PGG Trust Trust-
worthiness 
DG Charity  
Baseline treatment 
PDG 1      
PGG 0.312*** 1     
Trust 0.485*** 0.319*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.355*** 0.248*** 0.386*** 1   
DG 0.258*** 0.357*** 0.254*** 0.221*** 1  
Charity  0.154*** 0.259*** 0.191*** 0.129** 0.352*** 1 
All choices 0.285      
Pure cooperation 0.294      
Strategic choices 0.305      
Non-strategic choices 0.266      
Emotion treatment 
PDG 1      
PGG 0.303*** 1     
Trust 0.493*** 0.289*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.365*** 0.271*** 0.413*** 1   
DG 0.239*** 0.370*** 0.191*** 0.247*** 1  
Charity  0.215*** 0.264*** 0.228*** 0.235*** 0.321*** 1 
All choices 0.296      
Pure cooperation 0.291      
Strategic choices 0.313      
Non-strategic choices 0.247      
Reason treatment 
PDG 1      
PGG 0.283*** 1     
Trust 0.442*** 0.290*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.343*** 0.250*** 0.435*** 1   
DG 0.194*** 0.304*** 0.219*** 0.197*** 1  
Charity 0.111* 0.158*** 0.119* 0.0801 0.278*** 1 
All choices 0.247      
Pure cooperation 0.240      
Strategic choices 0.292      
Non-strategic choices 0.205      
Notes: N = 1,828. The table reports Pearson’ correlation coefficients. Stars mark p-values of correlation coefficients with 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and p-values for comparisons of each pair of games are Bonferroni-adjusted. Grey 
fields highlight cases in which the correlation coefficient is numerically larger (Emotion treatment) or smaller (Reason 
treatment) than in the Baseline treatment. PDG is an indicator for the choice to cooperate in the simultaneous prisoner’s 
dilemma game. PGG is an indicator for the choice to cooperate in a 4-player public goods game. Trust is an indicator for 
the choice to cooperate as first player in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. Trustworthiness is an indicator for the 
choice to cooperate as second player in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. DG is an indicator for the dictator choice 
to at least divide the pie in the dictator game equally. Charity is an indicator for the choice to divide the pie at least equally 
between the player and a charity for at least one of two charities. Pure cooperation is the average choice over all choices, 
excl. Trust. Strategic choices is the average over PDG, PGG and Trust. Non-strategic choices is the average over 
Trustworthiness, DG and Charity. 
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Table A4. Cooperation across games and traits in baseline treatment 
 Correlation with cooperation rate Cooperation rate across primary traits 
 Intuition scale Deliberation scale Primarily 
intuitive 
Primarily 
deliberative 
Intuitive vs. 
deliberative 
PDG 0.007 -0.016 0.679 0.637 1.000 
PGG -0.075 -0.041 0.609 0.587 1.000 
Trust 0.030 -0.017 0.642 0.630 1.000 
Trustworthiness -0.050 0.044 0.730 0.783 0.834 
DG 0.008 -0.056 0.670 0.589 0.305 
Charity -0.010 -0.005 0.674 0.670 1.000 
Notes: Sample size is n = 612. Columns 1-2 report the correlation coefficients of OLS regressions of the cooperation 
rate on the linear traits, none of which is significantly different from zero after Bonferroni adjustment for six tests. 
Columns 3-4 report average cooperation rates across primary decision-making trait. Column 5 reports p-values of Ȥ2-
tests, Bonferroni adjusted for six tests. All cooperation variables are binary. PDG is an indicator for the choice to 
cooperate in the simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. PGG is an indicator for the choice to cooperate in a 4-player 
public goods game. Trust is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as first player in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma 
game. Trustworthiness is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as second player in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma 
game. DG is an indicator for the dictator choice to at least divide the pie in the dictator game equally. Charity is an 
indicator for the choice to divide the pie at least equally between the player and a charity for at least one of two charities. 
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Table A6. Correlations across games and primary trait in baseline treatment 
 PDG PGG Trust Trust-
worthiness 
DG Charity  
Primarily intuitive 
PDG 1      
PGG 0.328*** 1     
Trust 0.463*** 0.277*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.345*** 0.308*** 0.377*** 1   
DG 0.216** 0.370*** 0.177 0.219** 1  
Charity  0.139 0.257*** 0.185* 0.0697 0.335*** 1 
All choices 0.271      
Pure cooperation 0.275      
Strategic choices 0.327      
Non-strategic choices 0.232      
Primarily deliberative       
PDG 1      
PGG 0.303*** 1     
Trust 0.496*** 0.342*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.366*** 0.217*** 0.395*** 1   
DG 0.276*** 0.350*** 0.293*** 0.232*** 1  
Charity  0.161** 0.260*** 0.194*** 0.164** 0.362*** 1 
All choices 0.294      
Pure cooperation 0.304      
Strategic choices 0.296      
Non-strategic choices 0.283      
Notes: Baseline treatment only. Sample size is n = 612. Stars mark p-values with * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and 
p-values for comparisons of each pair of games are Bonferroni-adjusted. Grey fields mark the larger coefficient when 
comparing across primary traits. 
 
Table A7. Cooperation across games and primary trait 
 Baseline 
treatment 
Emotion 
treatment 
Reason 
treatment 
Emotion 
vs. 
Reason 
Baseline 
vs. 
Emotion 
Baseline 
vs. 
Reason 
Primarily intuitive 
PDG 0.679 0.697 0.628 0.793 1.000 1.000 
PGG 0.609 0.543 0.541 1.000 0.968 0.937 
Trust 0.642 0.674 0.594 0.514 1.000 1.000 
Trustworthiness 0.730 0.792 0.657 0.011 0.787 0.616 
DG 0.670 0.593 0.531 1.000 0.575 0.022 
Charity 0.674 0.638 0.628 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Primarily deliberative 
PDG 0.637 0.724 0.605 0.002 0.055 1.000 
PGG 0.587 0.624 0.572 0.809 1.000 1.000 
Trust 0.630 0.721 0.552 0.000 0.037 0.152 
Trustworthiness 0.783 0.801 0.675 0.000 1.000 0.004 
DG 0.589 0.665 0.552 0.007 0.170 1.000 
Charity 0.670 0.678 0.564 0.006 1.000 0.013 
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Table A9. Correlations across games and primary trait in emotion treatment 
 PDG PGG Trust Trust-
worthiness 
DG Charity  
Primarily intuitive 
PDG 1      
PGG 0.205** 1     
Trust 0.466*** 0.176 1    
Trustworthiness 0.317*** 0.223** 0.357*** 1   
DG 0.155 0.330*** 0.0526 0.210** 1  
Charity  0.138 0.254*** 0.139 0.217** 0.257*** 1 
All choices 0.233      
Pure cooperation 0.217      
Strategic choices 0.248      
Non-strategic choices 0.150      
Primarily deliberative       
PDG 1      
PGG 0.359*** 1     
Trust 0.509*** 0.354*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.393*** 0.300*** 0.446*** 1   
DG 0.289*** 0.389*** 0.272*** 0.269*** 1  
Charity  0.259*** 0.267*** 0.279*** 0.245*** 0.357*** 1 
All choices 0.332      
Pure cooperation 0.333      
Strategic choices 0.351      
Non-strategic choices 0.303      
Notes: Emotion treatment only. Sample size is n = 612. Stars mark p-values with * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and 
p-values for comparisons of each pair of games are Bonferroni-adjusted. Grey fields mark the larger coefficient when 
comparing with the baseline treatment (Table A5).
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Table A10. Correlations across games and primary trait in reason treatment 
 PDG PGG Trust Trust-
worthiness 
DG Charity  
Primarily intuitive 
PDG 1      
PGG 0.254*** 1     
Trust 0.483*** 0.285*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.349*** 0.172 0.356*** 1   
DG 0.0985 0.281*** 0.210** 0.158 1  
Charity  0.0281 0.234** 0.0764 0.0335 0.239*** 1 
All choices 0.217      
Pure cooperation 0.219      
Strategic choices 0.258      
Non-strategic choices 0.175      
Primarily deliberative       
PDG 1      
PGG 0.300*** 1     
Trust 0.421*** 0.295*** 1    
Trustworthiness 0.341*** 0.291*** 0.478*** 1   
DG 0.245*** 0.315*** 0.226*** 0.218*** 1  
Charity  0.152** 0.122 0.137* 0.106 0.301*** 1 
All choices 0.263      
Pure cooperation 0.251      
Strategic choices 0.310      
Non-strategic choices 0.221      
Notes: Reason treatment only. Sample size is n = 604. Stars mark p-values with * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and 
p-values for comparisons of each pair of games are Bonferroni-adjusted. Grey fields mark the smaller coefficient when 
comparing with the baseline treatment (Table A5). 
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Appendix B – Robustness: Proven understanding of games 
A recent literature highlights potential issues of misunderstanding of cooperation games in 
experiments (Burton-Chellew et al. 2016, Isler et al. 2018). We measured understanding of the 
PDG and the PGG in two control questions, respectively, which were elicited after each game 
and were not incentivized. Therefore, our measure of understanding is likely to provide a lower 
bound of how well subjects understand cooperation games in survey experiments and may pick 
up other relevant factors, such as motivation and attention. We find that 46.50 percent of 
subjects failed to give the correct answer to at least one of the control questions for the PDG 
and 41.90 percent of subjects failed to give the correct answer to at least one of the control 
questions for the PGG (61.71 percent of subjects fail in at least one of the games). Treatments 
had no significant effect on understanding, except in the PGG, where inducing reason, rather 
than emotion, increases understanding rates (55.23 percent vs. 60.43 percent, X2 = 3.372, p = 
0.066). The exclusion of subjects due to understanding may lead to selection bias and the mis-
estimation of treatment effect sizes, while not accounting for understanding may lead to omitted 
variable bias. Here, we test the robustness of results to excluding subjects that did not prove 
understanding. 
Figure B1 illustrates the main treatment effects when excluding subjects that did not prove 
their understanding of the PDG or the PGG, or both. Also when controlling for understanding, 
we find that subjects who were instructed to rely on their emotions rather than their reason were 
more likely to cooperate across games and the overall effect size was larger (0.62 vs. 0.75, t = 
4.711, p < 0.001, d = 0.43). The effect of the emotion treatment, compared to the baseline 
treatment, was of similar size as in the full sample (0.72 vs. 0.75, t = -1.101, p = 0.272, d = 
0.11). The effect of the reason treatment was larger than in the full sample (0.72 vs. 0.62, t = 
3.792, p < 0.001, d = 0.37). Table B1 lists the treatment effects across games and different 
exclusions for understanding. In particular, it shows that the results for the prisoner’s dilemma 
game with proven understanding replicated the findings of Levine et al. (2019; Experiment 3): 
We find a positive effect of the emotion/reason-distinction in the PDG (77.54 percent vs. 64.24 
percent, X2 = 14.013, p < 0.001, d = 0.28, n = 978), which was primarily driven by a positive 
effect of the emotion treatment compared to the baseline treatment (68.42 percent vs. 77.54 
percent, X2 = 6.831, p = 0.009). 
Also for the subsample of individuals with proven understanding, the choices across games 
were more correlated in the emotion treatment than the reason treatment (ȡ = 0.312 vs. ȡ = 
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0.243, z = 1.963, p = 0.050), but only about 38.7 percent of the change is accounted for by the 
effect of the reason treatment when comparing to the baseline treatment (ȡ = 0.217). 
 
Figure B1. Treatment effects on cooperation when understanding proven 
 
Notes: The figure shows the frequency distribution of cooperation rates across 
treatments. The share of cooperative choices includes choices in the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, public goods game, trust game (trust and trustworthiness), dictator 
game and charitable giving. The difference reported are based on two-sided t-tests. 
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Table B1. Cooperation across games when understanding proven 
 Baseline 
treatment 
Emotion 
treatment 
Reason 
treatment 
Emotion 
vs. 
Reason 
Baseline 
vs. 
Emotion 
Baseline 
vs. 
Reason 
Understanding in PDG and PGG (n = 700) 
PDG 0.683 0.752 0.613 0.007 0.602 0.667 
PGG 0.696 0.676 0.617 1.000 1.000 0.423 
Trust 0.678 0.779 0.593 0.000 0.095 0.315 
Trustworthiness 0.852 0.860 0.661 0.000 1.000 0.000 
DG 0.683 0.694 0.613 0.399 1.000 0.667 
Charity 0.735 0.734 0.645 0.225 1.000 0.207 
Understanding in PDG (n = 978) 
PDG 0.684 0.775 0.642 0.001 0.054 1.000 
PGG 0.681 0.683 0.618 0.490 1.000 0.552 
Trust 0.663 0.766 0.597 0.000 0.021 0.497 
Trustworthiness 0.827 0.865 0.679 0.000 1.000 0.000 
DG 0.690 0.689 0.609 0.190 1.000 0.177 
Charity 0.724 0.745 0.630 0.010 1.000 0.061 
Understanding in PGG (n = 1,062) 
PDG 0.643 0.728 0.586 0.000 0.100 0.685 
PGG 0.646 0.645 0.592 0.883 1.000 0.789 
Trust 0.671 0.743 0.578 0.000 0.234 0.058 
Trustworthiness 0.813 0.846 0.663 0.000 1.000 0.000 
DG 0.655 0.689 0.586 0.027 1.000 0.350 
Charity 0.705 0.710 0.616 0.053 1.000 0.073 
Notes: Columns 1-3 report average cooperation rates across treatments. Columns 4-6 report p-values of Chi-
squared tests, Bonferroni adjusted for six tests. All variables are binary. PDG is an indicator for the choice to 
cooperate in the simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. PGG is an indicator for the choice to cooperate in a 4-
player public goods game. Trust is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as first player in a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Trustworthiness is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as second player in a sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma game. DG is an indicator for the dictator choice to at least divide the pie in the dictator game 
equally. Charity is an indicator for the choice to divide the pie at least equally between the player and a charity for 
at least one of two charities. 
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Figure B2 shows the differences in cooperation rates in the baseline treatment across traits 
for individuals with proven understanding. As in the main analysis, we find no significant 
effects of decision-making traits on cooperation in the baseline treatment. As in the main 
analysis, the correlation of choices across games was not significantly different across primarily 
intuitive and primarily deliberative decision makers on average (ȡ = 0.169 vs. ȡ = 0.255, z = 
1.224, p = 0.221). 
 
Figure B2. Cooperation across decision-making traits in the Baseline treatment with proven 
understanding (n = 230) 
 
 
Figure B3 shows the interaction effects of states and traits when excluding subjects without 
proven understanding. As in the main analysis, we find that the emotion treatment only affected 
individuals with a primarily deliberative trait; effect sizes here were similar to the main analysis 
(difference-in-difference: p = 0.403). The reason treatment affected the cooperation rates of 
individuals with either trait negatively with somewhat larger effect sizes than in the main 
analysis (difference-in-difference: p = 0.884). 
As in the main analysis, we find no significant effects of the treatments on the correlation 
of choices among each decision-making type, except for an increase the correlation of choices 
across games when inducing emotion in deliberative individuals (emotion: del. ȡ = 0.255 vs. ȡ 
= 0.338 vs., z = -2.043, p = 0.041; int. ȡ = 0.169 vs. ȡ = 0.233, z = -0.867, p = 0.386; reason: 
del. ȡ = 0.255 vs. ȡ = 0.285, z = -0.746, p = 0.456; int. ȡ = 0.169 vs. ȡ = 0.177, z = -0.110, p = 
0.913).  
 
 
 
Intuitive trait
ß = -0.001
p = 0.980
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
S
ha
re
 o
f c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
ch
oi
ce
s
1 2 3 4 5
Intuitive decision making trait
Deliberative trait
ß = -0.020
p = 0.477
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
S
ha
re
 o
f c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
ch
oi
ce
s
1 2 3 4 5
Deliberative decision making trait
Difference:
p = 0.791
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
sh
ar
e 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
s
0 .17 .33 .5 .67 .83 1
Share of cooperative choices
Primarily intuitive trait
Primarily deliberative trait
39 

Figure B3. Interactions effects on cooperative behavior when understanding proven 
(a) Emotion treatment (n = 222) 
(b) Reason treatment (n = 248) 
Notes: Panels 1 and 2 show scatters over 100 equally sized bins of the trait and regression lines from OLS regressions controlling for the respective 
other trait. The differences reported in panels 3 and 4 are based on a two-sided t-test.  
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Finally, Table B2 reports the relation between decision-making traits and socioeconomic 
characteristics when excluding subjects without proven understanding. We find that the relation 
between gender, age and education is robust to excluding these subjects. Students in this smaller 
sample (10.29 percent) were also more likely to exhibit a primarily deliberative decision-
making trait than other individuals (81.94 percent vs. 73.25 percent, Ȥ2 = 2.548, p = 0.110). 
 
Table B2. Socioeconomic characteristics across decision-making traits when understanding 
proven 
OLS regressions. Dependent variable: Primarily intuitive trait 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 0.095***   0.102*** 
 (0.033)   (0.033) 
Age  0.003***  0.004*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
High School   -0.211** -0.174** 
   (0.086) (0.083) 
Tertiary education   -0.336*** -0.308*** 
   (0.084) (0.081) 
Income Q2    -0.054 
    (0.056) 
Income Q3    -0.096* 
    (0.056) 
Income Q4    -0.073 
    (0.054) 
Income Q5    -0.036 
    (0.055) 
Constant 0.208*** 0.124** 0.526*** 0.301*** 
 (0.022) (0.050) (0.081) (0.099) 
Observations 700 700 700 700 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.010 0.009 0.037 0.060 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Female is an indicator of 
gender. Age is a linear measure of age. Educational levels High School and Tertiary education indicate 
the individual’s highest level of education, while the reference is an indicator for Primary Education. 
Income indicators are constructed according to quintiles of the sample.  
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Appendix C – Robustness: Attrition from survey 
In total, 2,306 individuals clicked on the link to the survey. 474 subjects left the survey before 
completion, i.e. the total attrition rate was 20.6 percent. 185 subjects (or, 39.03 percent of 
subjects with incomplete answers) did not start answering the survey questions at all. Thus, we 
could rule out selective attrition across treatment conditions for these subjects. The remaining 
289 subjects (or, 60.97 percent of incomplete answers) were assigned to either first answer the 
trait elicitation questionnaire (133 subjects) or to make decisions in the games (156 subjects). 
There was no significant difference in attrition rates across these conditions. 243 subjects (or, 
51.27 percent of incomplete answers) started making choices in the games and were assigned 
to a treatment condition. There was no significant difference in attrition rates across treatments. 
Finally, four participants were omitted from the main analysis for violating our age restriction 
(only subjects who were at least 18 years old could participate) or misreporting their age (being 
older than oldest persons in Sweden). Here we test the robustness of results to including subjects 
with incomplete information. 
Omitting subjects who did not start answering the survey leaves us with the information of 
a total of 2,121 subjects with complete (1,832 subjects) and incomplete (289 subjects) answers. 
A majority of incomplete answers contain missing values in the economic decisions (238 
subjects, or 82.35 percent), the trait elicitation (153 subjects, or 52.94 percent), or both (134 
subjects, or 46.37 percent). 
Accordingly, Figure C1 shows that treatment effects remained largely unchanged when 
accounting for attrition. Table C1 shows the treatment effects for each game, also allowing for 
data that is incomplete in the subset of economic decisions. The correlation across games was 
larger in the emotion treatment (Attrition I: ȡ = 0.30, Attrition II: ȡ = 0.30) than the reason 
treatment (Attrition I: ȡ = 0.26, p = 0.036; Attrition II: ȡ = 0.25, p = 0.058) with a majority of 
the effect being driven by inducing reason (Attrition I: 66.00 percent, Attrition II: 73.76 
percent).  
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Figure C1. Cooperation across treatments including attrition 
(a) All subjects who completed economic decisions
 
(b) All subjects who completed economic decisions and traits questionnaire
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Table C1. Cooperation across games including attrition 
 Baseline 
treatment 
Emotion 
treatment 
Reason 
treatment 
Emotion 
vs. 
Reason 
Baseline 
vs. 
Emotion 
Baseline 
vs. 
Reason 
All data (n = 2,121, unbalanced) 
PDG 0.650 0.707 0.605 0.009 0.583 0.773 
PGG 0.588 0.594 0.559 1.000 1.000 0.737 
Trust 0.627 0.694 0.568 0.000 0.215 0.299 
Trustworthiness 0.757 0.796 0.665 0.000 1.000 0.000 
DG 0.615 0.641 0.543 0.421 1.000 0.742 
Charity 0.679 0.660 0.579 0.249 1.000 0.191 
Economic decisions completed (n = 1,883) 
PDG 0.652 0.715 0.612 0.001 0.041 1.000 
PGG 0.592 0.593 0.562 0.785 1.000 1.000 
Trust 0.636 0.699 0.567 0.000 0.021 0.658 
Trustworthiness 0.766 0.797 0.666 0.000 0.885 0.000 
DG 0.616 0.637 0.543 0.102 1.000 0.137 
Charity 0.676 0.661 0.583 0.007 1.000 0.051 
Notes: Columns 1-3 report average cooperation rates across treatments. Columns 4-6 report p-values of Chi-
squared tests, Bonferroni adjusted for six tests. All variables are binary. PDG is an indicator for the choice to 
cooperate in the simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. PGG is an indicator for the choice to cooperate in a 4-
player public goods game. Trust is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as first player in a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Trustworthiness is an indicator for the choice to cooperate as second player in a sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma game. DG is an indicator for the dictator choice to at least divide the pie in the dictator game 
equally. Charity is an indicator for the choice to divide the pie at least equally between the player and a charity for 
at least one of two charities. 
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Figure C2 shows that also in this sample, there was no significant difference in cooperation 
behavior across traits (phenotype: int. vs. del.: 0.272 vs. 0.291, p = 0.539). Figure C3a shows 
that also in this sample, primarily deliberative individuals increased their cooperation in the 
emotion treatment and more than primarily intuitive individuals (p = 0.039), while Figure C3b 
shows that both types decreased cooperation in the reason treatment (p = 696). In line with the 
main results, we find no significant effects of the treatments on the correlation of choices among 
each decision-making type (emotion: del. ȡ = 0.291 vs. ȡ = 0.332, p = 0.108; int. ȡ = 0.272 vs. 
ȡ = 0.231, p = 0.250; reason: del. ȡ = 0.272 vs. ȡ = 0.221, p = 0.156, int. ȡ = 0.291 vs. ȡ = 0.266, 
p = 0.331). 
 
Figure C2. Cooperation across decision-making traits in the Baseline treatment including 
attrition (n = 620) 
 
Notes: Panel 1 and 2 show scatters over 100 equally-sized bins of each trait and regression lines from OLS regressions controlling for the 
respective other trait. The difference reported in panel 3 is based on a two-sided t-test.  
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Figure C3. Interactions effects on cooperative behavior 
(a) Emotion treatment (n = 646) 
(b) Reason treatment (n = 637) 
Notes: Panels 1 and 2 show scatters over 100 equally sized bins of the trait and regression lines from OLS regressions controlling for the respective 
other trait. The differences reported in panels 3 and 4 are based on a two-sided t-test.  
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Lastly, Table C2 shows that also the relation between decision-making traits and socio-
economic characteristics is robust to including cases of attrition for whom these variables are 
not missing. Students in this somewhat larger sample (7.52 percent) were also more likely to 
exhibit a primarily deliberative decision-making trait than other individuals (75.36 percent vs. 
64.03 percent, Ȥ2 = 7.189, p = 0.007). 
 
Table C2. Socioeconomic characteristics across decision-making traits including attrition 
OLS regressions. Dependent variable: Primarily intuitive trait 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 0.116***   0.119*** 
 (0.022)   (0.022) 
Age  0.002***  0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
High school   -0.143*** -0.123*** 
   (0.044) (0.044) 
Tertiary education   -0.270*** -0.255*** 
   (0.044) (0.044) 
Income Q2    -0.008 
    (0.035) 
Income Q3    -0.021 
    (0.035) 
Income Q4    0.020 
    (0.035) 
Income Q5    -0.015 
    (0.036) 
Constant 0.291*** 0.237*** 0.540*** 0.342*** 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.041) (0.057) 
Observations 1,834 1,834 1,834 1,834 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.014 0.006 0.029 0.048 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Female is an indicator of 
gender. Age is a linear measure of age. Educational levels High School and Tertiary education indicate 
the individual’s highest level of education, while the reference is an indicator for Primary Education. 
Income indicators are constructed according to quintiles of the sample.  
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Appendix D – Experimental Instructions 
General Instructions 
 
Welcome! 
Thank you for participating in our study. The experiment in this study serves research that 
aims to understand how people make decisions. This research is being conducted by Manja 
Gärtner at Linköping University. She may be reached at manja.gartner@liu.se for questions or 
to report a research-related problem.  
All decisions throughout this experiment are anonymous. The researchers do not know the 
identity of the respondents and no other participant will know who you are, nor will you know 
who other participants are.  
This study will take about 20 minutes to complete. 
The following experiment consists of several parts. You will be asked to make decisions that 
involve money and you have the chance to receive an additional payment. You will also be 
asked to answer questions about yourself. 
Throughout the experiment there will be instructions that guide you through each part. Please 
read the instructions carefully. 
Press next to start with the experiment. 
 
Economic Games (in random order) 
In this part of the experiment we ask you to make a number of decisions involving money. 
After the experiment, one of your decisions will be chosen at random and you will receive a 
payment according to that decision. CMA research AB will make sure that you will receive 
this payment within six weeks after the study ends, on top of the amount that you receive for 
participating. 
Note that, because some of the payments depend also on the decisions of other participants, 
you will not get to know directly after finishing the survey how much money you will receive. 
We promise that the information in this survey is truthful. We do not use deception and you 
will interact with other, real participants. 
 
Treatment (randomized) 
Before you start this part, we would like you to reflect on how one can make decisions. 
Sometimes people make decisions by using reason and relying on their brains. Other times, 
people make decisions by using emotion and relying on their hearts. 
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Many people believe that the brain [heart] is the part of our body that is most connected with 
good decision-making. When we think with our brains [feel with our hearts], rather than feel 
with our hearts [think with our brains], we make rationally [emotionally] satisfying decisions. 
In this part of the experiment, please make your decisions by relying on your brain 
[heart], rather than your heart [brain]. 
Please press next to start with the first question. 
 
Dictator game 
In the following question, we ask you how to allocate 60 SEK between yourself and another 
participant. For this, you are paired randomly with another participant in this study. After the 
experiment, one of you is selected at random and that person’s decision will determine the 
extra payments for you and the other participant.  
We will make sure that all payments reach the other participant. 
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
How much of the 60 SEK would you like to give to yourself and how much to another 
participant in this study? 
o To myself: ____  
o To other participant: ____ 
 
Charity  
In each of the following two questions, we ask you how to allocate 60 SEK between yourself 
and an organization, The Red Cross and unicef. The Red Cross is the world’s leading 
organization in helping people affected by armed conflict and disasters in conflict zones. 
Unicef defends the rights of children around the world, helping them to survive and develop.  
We will make sure that all payments reach the respective organization.  
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
Press next to start to make the decision. 
How much of the 60 SEK would you like to give to yourself and how much to the Red Cross?  
o To myself: ____  
o To Röda Korset: ____ 
 
How much of the 60 SEK would you like to give to yourself and how much to unicef?  
o To myself: ____ 
o To unicef: ____ 
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Public goods game 
In the following, you randomly assigned to interact with 3 other participants in this 
experiment. All of you receive this same set of instructions.  
Each person in your group is given 40 SEK for this interaction. You each decide whether to 
KEEP the 40 SEK for yourself, or to CONTRIBUTE it to the group. 
If you CONTRIBUTE, 80 SEK goes into the group’s common project, and is then evenly 
divided among the 4 group members. Thus, for every group member that chooses 
CONTRIBUTE, each group member receives 20 SEK. 
If everyone chooses CONTRIBUTE, everyone’s money will double: each of you will earn 80 
SEK. 
But if everyone else chooses CONTRIBUTE, while you KEEP the 40 SEK, you will earn 100 
SEK, while the others will earn only 60 SEK. That is because if you CONTRIBUTE, you 
only get 20 SEK back. 
Thus you personally lose money if you CONTRIBUTE, no matter what the others choose.  
Please make sure that you understand the instructions above. 
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
Press next to start making the decision. 
 
Do you choose to KEEP the 40 SEK for yourself or CONTRIBUTE 80 SEK to the group? 
KEEP the 40 SEK for yourself 
CONTRIBUTE 80 SEK to the group 
 
The next two items are meant to assess your understanding of the decision making task you 
just participated in. 
Which choice alternative in the previous screen did earn the highest monetary payoff for the 
group as a whole? 
KEEP the 40 SEK for yourself  
CONTRIBUTE 80 SEK to the group 
Which choice alternative in the previous screen did earn the highest monetary payoff for you 
personally? 
KEEP the 40 SEK for yourself 
CONTRIBUTE 80 SEK to the group 
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Prisoner’s dilemma games  
In this interaction you are matched with another person. You will be Person A, and your 
partner will be Person B. 
Both of you start with 30 SEK. If one of the questions is randomly selected for payment, you 
will receive the money you have at the end. 
You and Person B will both make a choice: Whether or not to transfer your 30 SEK to the 
other person, in which case they will get 60 SEK. If you both choose to transfer, you each get 
60 SEK. If neither of you transfer, you each get 30 SEK.  
But if you transfer while the other person does not, you get 0 SEK while the other person gets 
90 SEK. And if you do not transfer while the other person does, you get 90 SEK while the 
other person gets 0 SEK. 
Please make sure that you understand the instructions above. In the following four different 
decisions based on the above. 
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
Press next to start making the four decisions. 
 
If Person A and Person B choose at the same time, I choose:  
Knowing that Person B transferred 30 SEK, I choose: 
Knowing that Person B did not transfer 30 SEK, I choose: 
If Person B gets to know whether or not I transferred 30 SEK before making her/his choice, I 
choose: 
Transfer 30 SEK/ Do not transfer 30 SEK 
 
The next two items are meant to assess your understanding of the decision making task you 
just participated in. 
How many SEK do person Person A and Person B get if both choose to transfer 30 SEK? (30 
SEK each; 60 SEK each; Person A gets 0 SEK and Person B gets 90 SEK; Person A gets 90 
SEK and Person B gets 0 SEK) 
How many SEK do Person A and Person B get if Person A chooses to transfer 30 SEK but 
Person B does not transfer any SEK? (30 SEK each; 60 SEK each; Person A gets 0 SEK and 
Person B gets 90 SEK; Person A gets 90 SEK and Person B gets 0 SEK) 
 
  
51 

Risk elicitation  
In the following, you can either choose a fixed amount of money that you will receive for sure 
or to play. If you choose to play, we will flip a fair coin and you will receive 100 SEK if the 
head comes up on top, but you will receive 0 SEK if tails comes up on top. Thus, you have a 
50percentchance to win 100 SEK when you choose to flip the coin. 
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
Each time you press next, you will get to the next question. Press next when you are ready to 
start. 
 
Do you prefer (…) SEK for sure or to flip the coin for 100 SEK? (randomized order) 
35 SEK for sure – flip the coin for 100 SEK 
40 SEK for sure – flip the coin for 100 SEK 
45 SEK for sure – flip the coin for 100 SEK 
50 SEK for sure – flip the coin for 100 SEK 
55 SEK for sure – flip the coin for 100 SEK 
60 SEK for sure – flip the coin for 100 SEK 
65 SEK for sure – flip the coin for 100 SEK 
 
In the following, we give you a starter cash of 100 SEK. However, some of this money may 
be lost. You will face seven decisions on the following screens in which you can choose 
between losing a certain amount for sure and a lottery. If you choose the lottery, we will flip a 
fair coin and you lose nothing (0 SEK) if the head comes up on top, but you will lose 100 
SEK if tails comes up on top. Thus, you have a 50percentchance to loose nothing when you 
choose the lottery. 
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
Press next to start making the seven decisions. 
 
Do you prefer to lose (…) SEK for sure or to flip the coin for losing 100 SEK? (randomized 
order) 
Lose 65 SEK for sure – Flip the coin for losing 100 SEK 
Lose 60 SEK for sure – Flip the coin for losing 100 SEK 
Lose 55 SEK for sure – Flip the coin for losing 100 SEK 
Lose 50 SEK for sure – Flip the coin for losing 100 SEK 
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Lose 45 SEK for sure – Flip the coin for losing 100 SEK 
Lose 40 SEK for sure – Flip the coin for losing 100 SEK 
Lose 35 SEK for sure – Flip the coin for losing 100 SEK 
 
Time discounting  
In the following, we ask you to imagine that you win 1000 SEK. However, you can choose 
between receiving the 1000 SEK at a specific point in time or being paid a larger amount six 
months later. 
You will face twelve decisions. These decisions will not be selected for payment, but we ask 
to imagine that you could receive these payments for real.  
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
Press next to start making the decisions. 
Which option do you prefer? (randomized order) 
1000 SEK today 1025 SEK in six months  
1000 SEK today 1075 SEK in six months  
1000 SEK today 1125 SEK in six months  
1000 SEK today 1175 SEK in six months  
1000 SEK today 1225 SEK in six months  
1000 SEK today 1275 SEK in six months  
1000 SEK in six months 1025 SEK in twelve months  
1000 SEK in six months 1075 SEK in twelve months 
1000 SEK in six months 1125 SEK in twelve months 
1000 SEK in six months 1175 SEK in twelve months 
1000 SEK in six months 1225 SEK in twelve months 
1000 SEK in six months 1275 SEK in twelve months 
 
Jellybean task 
On the next screen you will see two bowls filled with jellybeans. Bowl A has 100 jellybeans, 
Bowl B has 10 jellybeans. You will be asked to choose one of the two bowls. Please imagine 
that once you have selected a bowl, you will select a bean from that bowl (without looking at 
the bowl).  
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This decision will not be selected for payment, but imagine that if you selected a black bean, 
you would win SEK 100. Would you select a bean from Bowl A or Bowl B? 
Remember to make your decisions by relying on your brain [heart], rather than your heart 
[brain]. Press next to start to make the decision. 
Press next to make your decision. 
 
Which bowl would you prefer if a black bean wins 100 SEK? (Bowl A, Bowl B) 
 
Manipulation check questions 
Please rate the following statements according to how well they describe you when answering 
the questions in the last part of this experiment. (5-point scale: 1 completely false to 5 
completely true) 
The instructions in this experiment made me think more about my decisions.  
I relied on my intuition when making the decisions in this experiment.  
I relied on my deliberation when making the decisions in this experiment.  
I relied on my emotions when making decisions in this experiment. 
 
Decision styles (USID) 
Imagine how you make decisions in life in general. Please rate each statement according to 
how well the statement describes you. (5-point scale: 1 completely false to 5 completely true) 
(Intuition scale) 
When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right than to have a 
rational reason for it. 
When I make a decision, I trust my inner feeling and reactions. 
With most decisions it makes sense to completely rely on your feelings. 
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I prefer drawing conclusions based on my feelings, my knowledge of human nature, and my 
experience of life. 
Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
I believe in trusting my hunches. 
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer. 
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
I generally make snap decisions.  
I make quick decisions.  
I am often aware of how to decide even before I review all aspects. 
I’ve had enough experience to just know what I need to do most of the time without trying to 
figure it out every time. 
The right way to decide usually comes to mind almost immediately. 
I typically figure out the way to decide swiftly.  
I quickly do the right thing when deciding because I’ve often faced almost the same thing 
before. 
I rarely need to mull things over; how to decide usually becomes quickly apparent. 
(Deliberation scale) 
Developing a clear plan is very important to me.   
I like detailed action plans.  
I prefer well-prepared meetings with a clear agenda and strict time management. 
I make definite engagements, and I follow up meticulously. 
When I make decisions, I proceed step-by-step.  
Before making decisions I usually think about the goals I want to achieve. 
I prefer making detailed plans rather than leaving things to chance. 
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
I want to have a full understanding of all problems. 
I like to analyze problems. 
I study every problem until I understand the underlying logic. 
I have no problem thinking things through carefully. 
I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
I prefer complex problems to simple problems. 
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I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 
 
Maximizing Tendency scale 
No matter what it takes, I always try to choose the best thing.  
I don’t like having to settle for “good enough”.  
I am a maximizer.  
No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for myself. 
I will wait for the best option, no matter how long it takes.  
I never settle for second best. 
I am uncomfortable making decisions before I know all of my options.  
Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine what all the other possibilities are, even 
ones that aren’t present at the moment. 
I never settle.  
 
Questionnaire 
In this last part of the experiment, we ask you to answer a number of questions about yourself. 
Please read the questions carefully and answer them as honestly as possible. 
Press next to start with the questions. 
 
Please rate how often you have engaged in the following activities within the last 12 months. 
(5-point scale: Never, Once, More Than Once, Often, Very often) 
I have given money to a charity (other than during this study). 
I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it). 
I have donate goods or clothes to charity. 
I have done volunteer work for a charity. 
I have donated blood. 
I have taken active steps to reduce my contribution to carbon emissions (the so called “CO2 
emissions footprint”), such as buying carbon offsets with flights, signing up for green energy, 
taking the train instead of flying, or other. 
I have paid my bills in time. 
I have saved money every month. 
I have saved towards a long-term goal such as buying a car, education or an apartment. 
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I have traded bonds, stocks or fonds. 
I have done physical exercise. 
I have smoked. 
 
Please answer the following questions about your life in general. 
Have you made an active choice of pension fund? (Never, Once, More than once) 
Would you like to donate your organs after death? (yes/no/don’t know) 
Did you register as organ donor? (yes/no) 
 
Which party would you vote for if there were to be an election today? (Centerpartiet, 
Feministiskt initiativ, Liberalerna (f.d. Folkpartiet), Kristdemokraterna, Miljöpartiet, 
Moderaterna, Socialdemokraterna, Sverigedemokraterna, Vänsterpartiet, Other party, Would 
leave a blank vote, Would not vote, Don’t know / Don’t want to answer) 
How much economic redistribution do you want in society? No redistribution means that the 
state does not influence the income distribution at all. Full redistribution means that everyone 
earns the same amount after taxes and subsidies. (Scale from 1 No redistribution to 10 Full 
redistribution) 
 
What is your gender? (man/woman) 
Which year were you born? 
What is your highest level of education? (1. Primary school 2. Secondary school 3. 
University, at most 3 years. 4. University, more than 3 years.) 
What is your current occupation? (Employed in the public sector, Employed in the private 
sector, Own business, Unemployed, Student, Retired) 
What is approximately your annual income (of you, not your household) before taxes in the 
last year (2016)? Annual income refers to wage income, capital income and pensions before 
taxes. It does not include transfers.  
What is approximately your household before taxes in the last year (2016)? Annual income 
refers to wage income, capital income and pensions before taxes. It does not include transfers.  
Which country were you born in? (Sweden/Other. Please specify) 
Are you married or living with a partner? (yes/no) 
Do you have children? (no, yes: 1,2,3, more than 3) 
 
Which country were your parents born in? (Mother/Father: Sweden/Other and specify) 
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How would you primarily classify your social background during your upbringing? (1. 
Working class 2. Lower middle class 3. Middle class 4. Upper middle class. 5. Upper class) 
What is/was your father’s highest education? (1. Primary school 2. Secondary school 3. 
University, at most 3 years. 4. University, more than 3 years) 
What is/was your mother’s highest education? (1. Primary school 2. Secondary school 3. 
University, at most 3 years. 4. University, more than 3 years) 
How would you primarily classify your current social standing? (1. Working class 2. Lower 
middle class 3. Middle class 4. Upper middle class. 5. Upper class) 
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